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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

ADDISON LUDWIG,

4:18-CV-04091-LLP

Plaintiff,
vs.
ELK-POINT JEFFERSON SCHOOL
DISTRICT 61-7, TRAVIS ASLESEN,
SHERI HARDMAN,

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO COMPEL
Docket No. 19

Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
This matter is pending before the court on plaintiff Addison Ludwig’s
complaint alleging defendants, her former high school, its principal (Mr. Travis
Aslesen), and superintendent (Ms. Sheri Hardman), violated her rights under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments and under Title IX. See Docket No. 1.
She also asserts various state-law torts. Id. Defendants filed a motion to
compel Ms. Ludwig to produce certain discovery, Docket No. 19, and the
district court, the Honorable Lawrence L. Piersol, referred that motion to this
magistrate judge for determination pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). See
Docket No. 22.
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FACTS
The following facts are drawn from Ms. Ludwig’s complaint. This is not
to suggest any imprimatur of veracity from the court as to those allegations.
The allegations are simply reproduced here to provide context for the motion
under consideration.
During the 2017-2018 school year, Ms. Ludwig was a senior high school
student at defendant school district. The school newspaper, “The Husky,”
featured a section called “Senior Spotlights” in which different seniors at the
school were interviewed and the interview was printed in The Husky. On
September 7, 2017, Ms. Ludwig was interviewed for a Senior Spotlights feature.
Asked what her hobbies were, she responded she liked to “Netflix n’ Chill with
my boyfriend,” among other activities.
The complaint asserts that the phrase “Netflix n’ Chill” has more than
one meaning. One meaning is, literally, to watch Netflix and relax. Another
meaning is a euphemism for having sex, a meaning Ms. Ludwig claims she was
innocent of.
Ms. Ludwig asserts a male senior student from the 2016-2017 school
year also said “Netflix n’ Chill” was one of his hobbies, it was reported as part
of the male’s Senior Spotlight interview with The Husky, and there were no
repercussions. She also asserts a male student wore to school a shirt with the
phrase “Netflix n’ Chill” printed on it and there were no repercussions for him.
Ms. Ludwig alleges she was penalized, punished and disciplined for
stating in her Senior Spotlight interview that one of her hobbies was “Netflix n’
2
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Chill.” Furthermore, she alleges on September 13, 2017, Mr. Aslesen
confronted Ms. Ludwig about the Netflix statement alone in his office, in
violation of school policy which indicates all students should have a samegender staff member present when gender-sensitive interrogations are
conducted. She alleges Mr. Aslesen made her look up the definition of “Netflix
n’ Chill” on her laptop and read the definition out loud, which included the
definition of a euphemism for sex. She alleges Mr. Aslesen accused her of
broadcasting through her Senior Spotlight interview that she made a hobby of
having sex with her boyfriend. Ms. Ludwig alleges this episode alone with
Mr. Aslesen in his office was humiliating, uncomfortable, shaming and
embarrassing for her.
As a result of this incident, Mr. Aslesen revoked Ms. Ludwig’s senior
privileges and honor study hall, removed her as editor of The Husky, moved her
to a new home room, and required her to write a retraction and apology to be
printed in both The Husky and the local newspaper of general circulation.
Ms. Ludwig alleges after this meeting, Mr. Aslesen did indeed contact the
local newspaper, the “Leader-Courier,”1 and shared federally-protected school
information about her with the paper as well as made defamatory comments
about her to the editor. Ms. Ludwig alleges Mr. Aslesen likewise shared private
information about her with a fellow student.
The website for the Leader-Courier & Times describes itself alternatively as
the newspaper of “Southern Union County,” of “Dakota Dunes/North Sioux
City,” and of “Dakota Dunes, Elk Point, Jefferson, & North Sioux City.” See
www.leadercourier-times.com, last checked July 31, 2019. All communities
referenced are in the far southeastern corner of South Dakota.
1
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Ms. Ludwig alleges her mother complained about Mr. Aslesen’s conduct
and a “sham” investigation was conducted, which exonerated him. She alleges
the school district was on notice of Mr. Aslesen’s questionable sexual
misconduct because two girls had made a report in January, 2013, that
Mr. Aslesen had made inappropriate sexual comments to them and looked
them “up and down.”
Defendants filed the instant motion to compel, asserting Ms. Ludwig had
not provided them with her initial disclosures as required by FED. R. CIV. P.
26(a)(1). See Docket No. 20. They also assert Ms. Ludwig failed to provide
discovery responses to interrogatories and requests for production served on
her. Id. In defendants’ reply brief, they indicate Ms. Ludwig provided many of
the requested items of discovery after the instant motion was filed. See Docket
No. 24.2 The court discusses the remaining outstanding discovery
disputes below.
DISCUSSION
A.

Interrogatory No. 5
Defendants served Ms. Ludwig with the following interrogatory:
INTERROGATORY NO. 5 Identify and describe any and all
handwritten or typewritten notes, reports, texts, diaries, calendars,
messages, letters, photographs, videos, inquiries, statements, or
other communication by you or on your behalf, from August 1,
2014, through the conclusion of high school and to the date of
these interrogatories, regarding any issue or claim raised in your
Complaint, including but not limited to email, text, instant

Defendants indicate there is no longer any outstanding dispute as to
Interrogatories Nos. 8 & 14, Requests for Production Nos. 6 & 7, and that
portion of initial discovery concerning production of documents as required by
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii).
2
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messenger, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, or any other digital
platform where communication may take place, and any other
communication by you or on your behalf, and for each, state:
(a) Name address [sic] of person making or providing the
statement, communication, or taking the photograph or
video;
(b) Date the statement, photograph, or video was made;
(c) If the statement is oral, the substance of such statement
and the name and present address of each individual who
heard it made;
(d) If the statement is written, the substance of such
statement, the name and present address of the person who
took the statement, and the custodian of the statement;
(e) Manner in which such statement was recorded;
(f) Name and address of person who has control or custody of
such statement, communication, photograph, or video;
(g) Subject matter of such statement, communication,
photograph, or video; and
(h) Description of what each statement, communication,
photograph, or video contains.
See Docket No. 23-9 at p. 5.3
Ms. Ludwig provided the following responses to Interrogatory No. 5:
ANSWER: Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory on the grounds
that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome. Plaintiff further
objects to this interrogatory on the grounds it inquires of
information protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or workproduct doctrine.
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER: Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory
on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.
Plaintiff further objects to this interrogatory on the grounds it
inquires of information protected by the attorney-client privilege
and/or work-product doctrine. Plaintiff’s Privilege Log is attached
herewith.
See Docket No. 23-9 at pp. 5-6.

The court interprets this request to call for any information “regarding any
issue or claim raised in [Ms. Ludwig’s] complaint,” and NOT “any …
communication.”
3
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Defendants seek an order compelling Ms. Ludwig to provide the names of
individuals providing or making the statement, the date of the statement, the
substance of the statement, and the name of the custodian of the document.
Also, while defendants admit Ms. Ludwig provided a privilege log, they assert
the log does not comply with Rule 26(b)(5) and defendants seek this court’s
order compelling Ms. Ludwig to produce a log that does comply with the rule.
Ms. Ludwig’s response to defendants’ motion to compel does not
elaborate on her written objections that the discovery is “overly broad and
unduly burdensome.” See Docket No. 23. Instead, Ms. Ludwig’s only response
is to allege she has repeatedly, both before and after the motion to compel was
filed, given defendants the discovery they seek.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) sets forth the scope of discovery
in civil cases pending in federal court:
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is
as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party=s claim or
defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in
controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the
parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the
issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within the scope
of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Rule 26 contains specific limitations relative to
electronic discovery and other objections to providing discovery:
(B)

Specific Limitations on Electronically Stored Information. A
party need not provide discovery of electronically stored
information from sources that the party identifies as not
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. On
motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the
6

Case 4:18-cv-04091-LLP Document 28 Filed 08/01/19 Page 7 of 25 PageID #: 221

party from whom discovery is sought must show that the
information is not reasonably accessible because of undue
burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court may
nonetheless order discovery from such sources if the
requesting party shows good cause, considering the
limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C). The court may specify the
conditions for the discovery.
(C)

When Required. On motion or on its own, the court must
limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed
by these rules or by local rule if it determines that:
(i)

the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or
duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source
that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less
expensive;

(ii)

the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to
obtain the information by discovery in the action; or

(iii)

the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by
Rule 26(b)(1).

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) and (C). A party claiming a privilege as to
requested discovery has the burden of proving the basis for the application of
the privilege:
When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable by
claiming that the information is privileged or subject to protection
as trial-preparation material, the party must:
(i)

expressly make the claim; and

(ii)

describe the nature of the documents,
communications, or tangible things not produced or
disclosed--and do so in a manner that, without
revealing information itself privileged or protected, will
enable other parties to assess the claim.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(A). If a party fails to respond to a proper request for
discovery, or if an evasive or incomplete response is made, the party requesting
the discovery is entitled to move for a motion compelling disclosure after having

7
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made a good faith effort to resolve the dispute by conferring first with the other
party. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a).
The scope of discovery under Rule 26(b) is extremely broad. See 8 Charles
A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2007, 36-37
(1970) (hereinafter "Wright & Miller"). The reason for the broad scope of
discovery is that "[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both
parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel
the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession." 8 Wright &
Miller, § 2007, 39 (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507-08, 67 S. Ct.
385, 392, 91 L. Ed. 2d 451 (1947)). The Federal Rules distinguish between
discoverability and admissibility of evidence. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1), 32, and
33(a)(2). Therefore, the rules of evidence assume the task of keeping out
incompetent, unreliable, or prejudicial evidence at trial. These considerations
are not inherent barriers to discovery, however.
The advisory committee’s note to the 2000 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1)
provide guidance on how courts should define the scope of discovery in a
particular case:
Under the amended provisions, if there is an objection that
discovery goes beyond material relevant to the parties’ claims or
defenses, the court would become involved to determine whether
the discovery is relevant to the claims or defenses and, if not,
whether good cause exists for authorizing it so long as it is relevant
to the subject matter of the action. The good-cause standard
warranting broader discovery is meant to be flexible.
The Committee intends that the parties and the court focus on the
actual claims and defenses involved in the action. The dividing
line between information relevant to the claims and defenses and
that relevant only to the subject matter of the action cannot be
8
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defined with precision. A variety of types of information not
directly pertinent to the incident in suit could be relevant to the
claims or defenses raised in a given action. For example, other
incidents of the same type, or involving the same product, could be
properly discoverable under the revised standard. ... In each case,
the determination whether such information is discoverable
because it is relevant to the claims or defenses depends on the
circumstances of the pending action.
The rule change signals to the court that it has the authority to
confine discovery to the claims and defenses asserted in the
pleadings, and signals to the parties that they have no entitlement
to discovery to develop new claims or defenses that are not already
identified in the pleadings. ... When judicial intervention is
invoked, the actual scope of discovery should be determined
according to the reasonable needs of the action. The court may
permit broader discovery in a particular case depending on the
circumstances of the case, the nature of the claims and defenses,
and the scope of the discovery requested.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note.
The same advisory committee’s note further clarifies that information is
discoverable only if it is relevant to the claims or defenses of the case or, upon
a showing of good cause, to the subject matter of the case. Id. “Relevancy is to
be broadly construed for discovery issues and is not limited to the precise
issues set out in the pleadings. Relevancy ... encompass[es] ‘any matter that
could bear on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on,
any issue that is or may be in the case.’ ” E.E.O.C. v. Woodmen of the World
Life Ins. Society, 2007 WL 1217919 at *1 (D. Neb. Mar. 15, 2007) (quoting
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)). The party
seeking discovery must make a “threshold showing of relevance before
production of information, which does not reasonably bear on the issues in the
case, is required.” Id. (citing Hofer v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 981 F.2d 377, 380

9
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(8th Cir. 1993)). “Mere speculation that information might be useful will not
suffice; litigants seeking to compel discovery must describe with a reasonable
degree of specificity, the information they hope to obtain and its importance to
their case.” Id. (citing Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 994 (8th Cir.
1972)).
Discoverable information itself need not be admissible at trial; rather,
“discovery of such material is permitted if reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory
committee’s note. Additionally, Rule 26(b)(2) requires the court to limit
discovery if it determines, for example, that the discovery sought is
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative or that “the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit...” See FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(2)(C); see also Roberts v. Shawnee Mission Ford, Inc., 352 F.3d 358, 361
(8th Cir. 2003) (“The rule vests the district court with discretion to limit
discovery if it determines, inter alia, the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”); Continental Illinois Nat’l Bank & Trust
Co. of Chicago v. Caton, 136 F.R.D. 682, 684-85 (D. Kan. 1991) (“All discovery
requests are a burden on the party who must respond thereto. Unless the task
of producing or answering is unusual, undue or extraordinary, the general rule
requires the entity answering or producing the documents to bear that
burden.”).
Once the requesting party has made a threshold showing of relevance,
the burden shifts to the party resisting discovery to show specific facts
10
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demonstrating that the discovery is not relevant, or how it is overly broad,
burdensome, or oppressive. Penford Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 265
F.R.D. 430, 433 (N.D. Iowa 2009); St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Commercial
Financial Corp., 198 F.R.D. 508, 511 (N.D. Iowa 2000). The articulation of
mere conclusory objections that something is “overly broad, burdensome, or
oppressive,” is insufficient to carry the resisting party’s burden--that party
must make a specific showing of reasons why the relevant discovery should not
be had. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Fine Home Managers, Inc., 2010 WL 2990118,
*1 (E.D. Mo. 2010); Burns v. Imagine Films Entertainment, Inc., 164 F.R.D.
589, 593 (W.D.N.Y. 1996).
Several courts have determined that where the discovery requests are
relevant, the fact that answering them will be burdensome and expensive is not
in itself a reason for a court’s refusing to order discovery which is otherwise
appropriate. See In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 83 F.R.D. 260, 265
(N.D. Ill. 1979) (stating that “[b]ecause the interrogatories themselves are
relevant, the fact that answers to them will be burdensome and expensive ‘is
not in itself a reason for refusing to order discovery which is otherwise
appropriate’ ”); Alexander v. Parsons, 75 F.R.D. 536, 539 (W.D. Mich. 1977)
(stating that “the mere fact discovery is burdensome . . . is not a sufficient
objection to such discovery, providing the information sought is relevant or
may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence”); and Burns, 164 F.R.D. at
593 (determining that the fact that answering interrogatories will require the
objecting party to expend considerable time, effort, and expense consulting,
11
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reviewing, and analyzing huge volumes of documents and information is an
insufficient basis for an objection). Moreover, if discovery requests are
relevant, the fact that they involve work, which may be time consuming, is not
sufficient to render them objectionable. See United States v. Nysco Labs., Inc.,
26 F.R.D. 159, 161-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) and Rogers v. Tri-State Materials Corp.,
51 F.R.D. 234, 245 (N.D. W. Va. 1970) (stating that “[i]nterrogatories, otherwise
relevant, are not objectionable and oppressive simply on grounds [that] they
may cause the answering party work, research and expense”).
Ms. Ludwig’s objection that the discovery request is overly broad and
unduly burdensome does not carry the day. She never explains what burden is
involved or why it is undue. However, defendants’ showing is likewise lacking.
Defendants never explain why the information they seek is relevant—how does
it pertain to the issues, claims or defenses? What is it defendants hope to find?
Defendants do not address these questions. And the answers are not
altogether self-evident. It is defendants’ burden to make an initial showing of
relevance.
The court notes that Ms. Ludwig’s complaint is fairly surgical, involving
an interview for the school newspaper on September 7, 2017, and an
interaction with the principal on September 13, 2017. The court retains the
power to limit discovery to what is proportional to the case, including the
amount in controversy (likely fairly small), the parties’ access to relevant
information, and the parties’ resources (Ms. Ludwig is a college student).
Interrogatory number 5 asks for virtually every bit of communication, much of
12
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it digital, for a five-year period (2014 to 2019). That is excessive given the
circumstances of this case. The court will limit Ms. Ludwig’s obligation to
respond to a period of two years—one year predating September, 2017, and one
year post-dating that time. Thus, she should answer interrogatory number 5
for the period from September, 2016, to September, 2018. This restriction is
especially appropriate given Ms. Ludwig’s willingness to make her cell phone
available for inspection, as discussed in further detail below.
The court’s directive to Ms. Ludwig includes everything that is responsive
to interrogatory number 5. If there is information truly privileged called for by
this interrogatory, Ms. Ludwig must provide a revised privilege log that
complies with Rule 26(b)(5). That is, Ms. Ludwig must (1) expressly identify a
particular document or information being withheld, (2) describe its nature with
enough detail to allow defendants to assess the privilege without revealing the
information that is privileged, and (3) expressly identify what privilege she is
asserting.
As to this and all other discovery requests addressed in this order,
Ms. Ludwig must (1) produce the requested discovery or (2) produce the revised
privilege log as to any documents or information withheld and these actions
must take place no later than 30 days from the date of this order.
B.

Interrogatory No. 10
Ms. Ludwig responded to this interrogatory by providing the information

requested, but also contemporaneously asserting an objection based on
attorney-client privilege and/or work product privilege. Because of the duality
13
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of Ms. Ludwig’s response, defendants are at a loss to ascertain whether any
documents or information are being withheld pursuant to an assertion of
privilege. Accordingly, they request an order from the court directing
Ms. Ludwig to clearly state whether any information is being withheld and, if
so, to provide a privilege log for such information in accordance with the
dictates of Rule 26(5).
The court grants this request in its entirety. The practice of both giving
information/documents and simultaneously asserting an objection or privilege
is a deplorable practice. It deprives the discovery response of the needed
clarity to know whether any information or documents are being withheld.
This subverts the twin aims of the federal rules to provide a just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of federal civil claims. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
Ms. Ludwig is ordered to serve a new discovery response to interrogatory
number 10 within 30 days of the date of this order clearly indicating whether
any information is being withheld pursuant to privilege. If so, Ms. Ludwig is
ordered to provide defendants with a revised privilege log that complies with
Rule 26(b)(5) as detailed above.
C.

Interrogatory No. 12
In this discovery request, defendants ask Ms. Ludwig if she had or

possessed a cell phone on September 13, 2017, and, if so, to produce it to
defendants for examination. See Docket No. 23-9 at p. 9. Ms. Ludwig agreed
(ultimately) to make her cell phone available for inspection, but only for
information relevant to the pending matter and excluding attorney-client and
14
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work-product information. Id. Ms. Ludwig provided defendants with a cell
phone log depicting calls made from it on the date specified and also supplied a
privilege log. Id.
Defendants assert they should not be restricted in their examination of
Ms. Ludwig’s cell phone by her own conceptions of what is “relevant” evidence
and also assert the privilege log does not comply with Rule 26(b)(5). They seek
this court’s order directing Ms. Ludwig to produce her cell phone for apparently
unfettered examination except for those items adequately supported by a
proper privilege log. As with interrogatory number 5, defendants never address
relevancy with regard to their request to inspect Ms. Ludwig’s phone, other
than to object to being hamstrung by Ms. Ludwig’s concept of relevancy.
As the Supreme Court has observed, the term “cell phone” is somewhat
of a misnomer. The electronic devices nearly all Americans have practically
appended to their bodies might just as well be called filing cabinets, video
cameras, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums,
televisions, maps or newspapers. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014).
Overarching privacy concerns are implicated by a search of one’s cell phone.
Id. Typical cell phones (in 2014) have a standard capacity to hold 16 gigabytes
of information, which translates into millions of pages of text, thousands of
pictures, or hundreds of videos. Id. at 394. This results in a device the size of
a cigarette package that contains many distinct types of information which
potentially allows a viewer to determine the sum of an individual’s private life
to be reconstructed. Id. People don’t need to create diaries these days. The
15
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date and location stamp on many cell phone files and the GPS data from one’s
phone can recreate the date, time and location of romantic assignations,
religious affiliations, private medical information, vacations, and a whole host
of erstwhile private information. Id.
As noted above, Ms. Ludwig’s complaint is fairly surgical in time and in
the incidents which form the basis of her claims. She has not put her whole
life under the microscope merely by filing this complaint. The court restricts
defendants’ examination of her phone to files created between September,
2016, and September, 2018, inclusive. Further, defendants shall restrict their
search to any items having to do with Netflix ‘n Chill and the specific incidents
set forth in Ms. Ludwig’s complaint, including Ms. Ludwig’s damages. Any
phone call, text message, or data associated with Ms. Ludwig’s current counsel
of record or past counsel of record (Mr. Timothy James), shall not be viewed by
defendants. As to any such items, defendants shall notify Ms. Ludwig of the
existence of these items associated with her counsel. Ms. Ludwig shall then
have 30 days from the date of notice from defendants to decide whether to
assert a claim of privilege. If Ms. Ludwig does claim privilege, she must, within
those 30 days, submit a privilege log to defendants that complies with Rule
26(b)(5).
D.

Interrogatory No. 15 and Request for Production No. 17
Defendants asked the following in their Interrogatory No. 15:
INTERROGATORY NO. 15 Are you claiming monetary damages?
If so, state with specificity the amount of damages you are claiming
and the facts you claim support your claim for damages.
16
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See Docket No. 23-9 at p. 10. Ms. Ludwig gave the following answers:
ANSWER: Plaintiff has not yet calculated her damages to date and
specifically objects to the production of her attorney’s method of
calculation of said damages on the basis that it seeks information
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or attorney workproduct doctrine. Subject to and without waiving said objection,
Plaintiff anticipates presenting claims for nominal damages,
compensatory damages, punitive damages and/or recovery of
attorney fees.
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER: Plaintiff has not yet determined her
special damages. As to general damages and punitive damages
those are amounts are [sic] to be determined by a jury. Plaintiff
may or may not make a specific request to the jury.
Discovery hasn’t been completed. Plaintiff will supplement as
discovery continues.
See Docket No. 23-9 at p. 10.
Request for production number 17 simply requests all documents which
Ms. Ludwig asserts supports her claim for damages. Id. at p. 17. Ms. Ludwig
answered this discovery request by asserting the attorney-client privilege
and/or work-product doctrine without providing a privilege log in conformity
with Rule 26(5). Id. She also stated “Plaintiff has not affirmatively calculated
her damages.” Id.
Defendants demand “immediate production of the information requested”
and also seek an order from the court prohibiting Ms. Ludwig from introducing
any evidence of damages at trial if the requested information and documents
are not immediately produced.
A calculation of one’s damages and any supporting documents are
among the items a plaintiff is required to include in her initial voluntary Rule
26 disclosures. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii). There is nothing secret or
17
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privileged about this information. It is a claim or defense disputed and in issue
in this lawsuit. If Ms. Ludwig is claiming emotional distress damages, she
should so state and turn over any diary entries, letters, counseling records and
fees, etc. that pertain to this. If publication of her information in the local
newspaper caused her embarrassment or the loss of job, scholarship, or college
opportunities, that must be asserted and supported. Applications she made
that were denied would be documents in support of such damages.
This case is nearly two years removed now from the events detailed in
Ms. Ludwig’s complaint. She and her lawyers must have some idea, no matter
how general, of her categories of damages and documents that may support
those damages. Also, the obligation to provide discovery and to supplement it
is ongoing throughout the litigation. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e). As Ms. Ludwig
and her lawyers are able to clarify their damages as discovery progresses, they
must update defendants with new information and documents. Ms. Ludwig is
ordered to comply fully with interrogatory 15 and request for production 17
within 30 days from the date of this order. Defendants may raise their
argument for exclusion of damages evidence on the eve of trial if no
information, or incomplete or insufficient information, is given to them by that
date. At this early stage, the court will not grant an in limine order on this
showing.
E.

Request for Production No. 1
Ms. Ludwig responded to this document request by providing documents

requested, but also contemporaneously asserting an objection based on
18
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attorney-client privilege and/or work product privilege. Because of the duality
of Ms. Ludwig’s response, defendants are at a loss to ascertain whether any
documents are being withheld pursuant to an assertion of privilege.
Furthermore, the privilege log provided by Ms. Ludwig does not provide the
information required by Rule 26(b)(5).
Defendants’ motion to compel is granted in full as to request for
production number 1. Ms. Ludwig shall, within 30 days of this order, file a
new response to request for production number 1 that clearly indicates
whether any documents are being withheld. As to any documents withheld,
Ms. Ludwig must file a privilege log within 30 days that conforms to the
dictates of Rule 26(b)(5).
F.

Request for Production No. 4
Request for production number 4 requests Ms. Ludwig to provide any

documents identified in response to interrogatory number 5, reprinted in full
above. Ms. Ludwig responded with an assertion of attorney-client privilege
and/or attorney work-product doctrine as to all such documents. Although
Ms. Ludwig provided a privilege log, that log simply makes a blanket assertion
of privilege for all “correspondence between Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel.”
Defendants object that the privilege log provided does not comply with the
requirements of Rule 26(b)(5).
As indicated above in its ruling on interrogatory number 5, the court sua
sponte restricts Ms. Ludwig’s obligation to provide documents to the period
from September, 2016, to and including September, 2018. If there are any
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documents within that date range that Ms. Ludwig claims are privileged, she
must file a revised privilege log that conforms to Rule 26(b)(5) within 30 days
from the date of this order.
G.

Request for Production No. 16
Request for production number 16 requested Ms. Ludwig to produce all

her cell phone records for September 13, 2017, or, in the alternative, to execute
an “Authorization allowing the [defendants] to obtain these records.” See
Docket No. 23-9 at p. 16. Ms. Ludwig did execute the authorization, but also
asserted a claim of attorney-client privilege. Defendants assert Ms. Ludwig’s
assertion of privilege does not comply with Rule 26(5). The court finds the
resolution of this disputed discovery request is encompassed by the court’s
ruling on interrogatory number 12. The court directs the parties to proceed
with request for production number 16 in like manner as directed with regard
to interrogatory number 12.
H.

Rule 26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures
In her initial disclosures, Ms. Ludwig listed 24 names of individuals she

believes are likely to have discoverable information, but for 17 of these persons,
only the name was listed with no address or other contact information. She
maintains she does not have to secure addresses because the witnesses
disclosed “are equally available” to both Ms. Ludwig and defendants.
Defendants argue Ms. Ludwig is under a duty to make reasonable
inquiry of the witnesses she discloses in her initial disclosures and addresses
are required by Rule 26(a)(1). Defendants assert they need the addresses so as
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to be able to contact the witnesses and make decisions about who they wish
to depose.
Rule 26(a)(1) provides explicitly that addresses need not be provided by
the disclosing party if they are not known: “a party must, without awaiting a
discovery request, provide to the other parties: (i) the name and, if known, the
address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable
information—along with the subjects of that information—that the disclosing
party may use to support its claims or defenses, . . .” See FED. R. CIV. P.
26(a)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). The cases cited by defendants in support of
their assertion are inapposite.
The case of St. Paul Reinsurance Co., Ltd. v. Commercial Financial
Corp., 198 F.R.D. 508, 514 (N.D. Iowa 2000), was not interpreting a party’s
duty to provide initial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1). In another case cited by
defendants, the nondisclosing party knew, but refused to disclose in its initial
disclosures the contact information for 3,300 identified witnesses who were the
party’s employees. See Tamas v. Family Video Movie Club, Inc., 304 F.R.D.
543, 545 (N.D. Ill. 2015). Likewise, in In re Independent Serv. Orgs. Antitrust
Litigation, 168 F.R.D. 651, 653 (D. Kan. 1996), the nondisclosing party was
subject to a deposition, not the initial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1), and the
information was available to the nondisclosing party from its own employees.
This distinguishes these authorities from the instant case. Defendants have
not adduced any proof that Ms. Ludwig knows the addresses of the 17
witnesses and is simply withholding that information.
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The case of Sender v. Mann, 225 F.R.D. 645, 651 (D. Colo. 2004), did
involve initial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1). In that case, the plaintiff had
identified by name and address 322 investors and brokers who “had
knowledge” regarding defendant’s alleged Ponzi scheme. Id. at 648-49.
Although plaintiff had supplemented its Rule 26 initial disclosures multiple
times, plaintiff never gave any greater specificity about what, exactly, these
witnesses knew. Id. at 649. Furthermore, on the very eve of trial, plaintiff
remained coy regarding which of these witnesses it would call to testify at
trial. Id.
The court took issue with plaintiff’s too-general identification of what
each witness knew and whether they would be called to testify at trial. Id. at
650. On the brink of trial, plaintiff’s counsel admitted at a hearing that he had
not even interviewed all the witnesses listed. Id. The court held, in the context
of the facts of that case, a “reasonable investigation” required by Rule 26(a)(1)
required more of plaintiff’s counsel. Id.
In particular, the court pointed out in connection with defendants’
summary judgment motion, plaintiff had supplied two affidavits from among
the 322 witnesses listed and the affidavits set forth very detailed information.
Id. Plaintiff had never updated its initial disclosures to provide this
information to defendants. Id. Furthermore, in its pretrial submissions,
plaintiff stated one of the witnesses would testify about “scripts” defendants
had assisted in preparing to carry out the Ponzi scheme, and neither the
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affidavits submitted in connection with summary judgment practice nor the
plaintiff’s initial disclosures made any mention of these “scripts.” Id.
The Sender case is distinguishable on numerous grounds. First, the
sheer number of witnesses involved—322—pales in comparison to the 17
witnesses involved here. Second, the missing information in Sender was not
the addresses, which the very text of Rule 26 leaves open. Finally, initial
disclosures are subject to a continuing duty to supplement as the case
progresses. In Sender, despite a full opportunity for discovery and summary
judgment practice, the plaintiff had never supplemented its initial disclosures
to include information plaintiff indisputably knew, as evidenced by the witness
affidavits and the description of at least one witness’s anticipated
trial testimony.
Ms. Ludwig need not disclose addresses for the 17 witnesses at this time
if she truly does not know them. But both parties have a duty to supplement
their initial disclosures as the case moves forward. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e). If
Ms. Ludwig gains information about the 17 witnesses’ contact information
and/or greater detail regarding the subjects of their knowledge, she is under a
duty to supplement her initial disclosures and to tell defendants about this
later-acquired information. Id. Failure to do so may result in evidence from
these witnesses being excluded at trial, in hearings, or during motions practice.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1). As an additional sanction for violating one’s
discovery duties, the jury may be told of the party’s failure to honor its duty to
provide or supplement discovery and attorney’s fees and expenses for
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defendants occasioned by the failure to disclose may be ordered. Id. at
(c)(1)(A) & (B).
I.

Sanctions
Defendants make passing references to their desire to receive attorney’s

fees and costs as sanctions for having to file the instant motion to compel.
Although Ms. Ludwig’s response to the motion asserts the discovery was
provided repeatedly to defendants, both before and after the motion to compel
was filed, defendants deny this and argue Ms. Ludwig provides no proof of such
actions such as a certificate of service.
Rule 37 requires a court which grants a motion to compel to require the
nonmoving party to pay the moving party’s attorney’s fees—the rule uses the
term “must.” Sanctions are the rule, then, unless the nonmoving party can
establish the existence to one of three exceptions: (1) the movant filed the
motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the discovery without court
action; (2) the nonmoving party’s position was substantially justified; or
(3) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. See FED. R. CIV. P.
37(a)(5)(A). If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court “may”
apportion the reasonable expenses for the motion. Id. at (a)(5)(C).
If defendants wish to pursue monetary sanctions in connection with this
partial granting of their motion to compel, the court directs them to file a
motion seeking those sanctions supported by affidavits and documentary
evidence as set forth in DSD LR 54.1C. Ms. Ludwig will then have 21 days to
respond to that motion.
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CONCLUSION
Defendants’ motion to compel, Docket No. 19, is granted in part and
denied in part as more specifically described in the body of this opinion.
DATED August 1, 2019.
BY THE COURT:
VERONICA L. DUFFY
United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), any party may seek reconsideration
of this order before the district court upon a showing that the order is clearly
erroneous or contrary to law. The parties have fourteen (14) days after service
of this order to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A),
unless an extension of time for good cause is obtained. See FED. R. CIV. P.
72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Failure to file timely objections will result in
the waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. Id. Objections must be
timely and specific in order to require review by the district court. Thompson
v. Nix, 897 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1990); Nash v. Black, 781 F.2d 665 (8th Cir.
1986).
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